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REFORM VIRGINIA'S CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS
TO REMOVE THE PROFIT INCENTIVE AND CURTAIL
THE ABUSE OF POWER
Rob Poggenklass *
"In theory, asset-forfeiture seizures make excellent sense. They de-
prive criminal syndicates of the tools of their trade, and they pro-
vide much-needed funds for law-enforcement agencies. In reality,
they're a hot mess."
-Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch'
In November 2011, a trooper from the Virginia State Police
pulled over a car on Interstate 95 near Emporia, Virginia, for
traffic violations.2 The trooper, who alleged that the driver was
both traveling 86 mph in a 70 mph zone and following another
vehicle too closely, never issued a citation or pressed charges
against either of the two men inside the car.' Instead, the trooper
seized $28,500 in cash.4 Lawyers for Victor Guzman, the passen-
ger in the car, had to convince a U.S. Attorney that the money
consisted of cash donations to help build a church in El Salvador.5
Guzman and his brother-in-law, the driver, were transporting the
funds to Atlanta at the church's request when the trooper stopped
* Tony Dunn Legal Fellow, ACLU of Virginia. J.D., William & Mary Marshall-
Wythe School of Law; B.A., Cornell College. Funding for the fellowship that allowed me to
research and write this paper at the ACLU of Virginia was provided by the Tony Dunn.
Foundation. Invaluable research assistance was provided by Thomas Okuda Fitzpatrick, a
former Dunn Fellow and a fellow 2010 graduate of William & Mary Law School. I am also
grateful for the comments and encouragement of Rebecca Glenberg and Claire Guthrie
Gastafiaga.
1. Editorial, Law Enforcement: Inexcusable, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, June 29, 2010,
at A6 [hereinafter Editorial, Law Enforcement: Inexcusable].





5. Cases: Some Forfeiture Cases Which David Smith Defended or for Which He Pro-
vided Counsel or Expert Testimony: 2012 Highway Robbery, SMITH & ZIMMERMAN (2015),
http://smithzimmerman.com/cases/.
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them.6 The trooper had not accepted their attempts to explain the
situation, in part because they said-honestly and accurately-
that the money was not their own. Four months later, in March
2012, federal immigration authorities finally cut a $28,500 check
to the church, returning the money seized by state police.7
Virginia's civil asset forfeiture scheme for drug-related crimes
is overdue for reform. Under Virginia law, the government can
seize an individual's car, cash, or other property without bringing
corresponding criminal charges by filing a civil lawsuit alleging
that the property is related to a criminal act.' In fact, even if
criminal charges are brought, an acquittal will not necessarily
prevent the government from seizing and keeping the assets. If it
is probable the property is related to drug dealing, then most of
the revenue from the forfeited property goes to the local law en-
forcement agency that seized the property.9 These laws have re-
sulted in a civil asset forfeiture regime that is considered one of
the worst in the nation for property rights and due process pro-
tection.0 For the government, however, it is immensely profitable.
Since July 1991, more than $105 million in asset forfeiture funds
have been distributed to Virginia law enforcement agencies.1
The precursors to today's asset forfeiture laws date back centu-
ries and were used in different forms throughout the history of
our country. The current iterations of civil asset forfeiture laws
were adopted, however, primarily in the 1980s as law enforce-
ment tools in the war on drugs. Many states adopted asset forfei-
ture laws that allowed law enforcement agencies to seize property
and money used in the drug trade.2 These measures were sold to
the public primarily as crime fighting tools to deprive drug deal-
ers of resources needed for the illegal drug trade and as punitive
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.22 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
9. Jarret B. Wollstein, The Government's War on Property, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC.
(July 1993).
10. MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 96-97 (Mar. 2010), http://www.ij.org/images/pdfLfolder/other_
pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf.
11. VA. DEP'T OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., PROGRAM STATISTICS, http://www.dcjs.virgin
ia.gov/fasp/stats.cfm (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
12. J.F., What Civil Asset Forfeiture Means, ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.
economist.con/node/21598852.
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measures to deprive criminals from the spoils of drug dealing.13
They also allowed for the seized cash and proceeds from the sale
of other seized property to be used in crime fighting efforts.4
Heralded as a valuable tool to counter the moneyed power of
drug gangs and drug dealers, the implementation of civil asset
forfeiture laws for illegal narcotics garnered significant criticism
by civil liberties and property rights advocates from the outset.
Property rights and due process concerns resulted in reforms of
the federal forfeiture scheme in the 1990s and early 2000s. In
Virginia, however, the low burden of proof required to confiscate
property permanently and the award of forfeiture proceeds to lo-
cal law enforcement agencies have resulted in an unjust civil as-
set forfeiture scheme in need of reform. The laws in Virginia have
devolved from a purely utilitarian tool in the war on drugs to a
revenue cow for cash-strapped local law enforcement agencies.
Part I of this article will review the historical roots of civil asset
forfeiture law. Part II will provide a more modern history of these
laws and an overview of Virginia's current asset forfeiture
scheme. Part III will examine the criticism of Virginia's drug-
related civil asset forfeiture laws and highlight due process con-
cerns, risk of abuse of power, and misallocation of priorities due
to the structure of these laws in Virginia. Finally, Part IV will
provide recommendations to reform Virginia's civil asset forfei-
ture laws.
I. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS
A. In Rem We Trust
Although the application of civil asset forfeiture has ballooned
since the war on drugs started in the 1980s, the Supreme Court
has noted that forfeiture of property is a time-honored method to
prevent illegal activity." Modern asset forfeiture jurisprudence is
based on English common law theories that the government can
13. See JIMMY GURULk ET AL., THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE 229-30 (2d ed. 2004).
14. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 10, at 15.
15. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 56 (1932)
("Forfeiture of vehicles bearing smuggled goods is one of the time-honored methods adopt-
ed by the government for the repossession of the crime of smuggling.").
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seize property associated with criminal acts.16 This legal theory,
in turn, has roots in the Old Testament. According to Exodus
21:28, "If an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall
surely be stoned and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of
the ox shall go unpunished."'7 The implication of this biblical sto-
ry is that "an ox can be a moral agent" of the injustice, even in the
absence of any corresponding criminal culpability of the owner."
Similar concepts existed in the ancient Greek and Roman tradi-
tions of noxal surrender, "which involved the surrendering of the
agent or instrument causing damage or death to the victim or his
or her kin."'"
The notion that property, rather than an individual, could be
held responsible evolved into the English common law concept of
deodand. "Derived from the Latin phrase Deo Dandum, meaning
to be given to God," deodand involved forfeiting to the King per-
sonal property of the killer that was considered the imminent
cause of an individual's death. The practice was based on the
view that the property that caused the death was guilty of an of-
fense against God and that "religious atonement was required.""0
The collection of guilty property eventually evolved21 into the ac-
cepted theory that property could be taken from an owner regard-
less of whether the owner was actually convicted of a crime.22 In
fact, by some accounts, "[f]or the royal deodand collectors, the
guilt or innocence of the object's owner in relation to the accident
had little or no relevance to the forfeiture of the property."23 The
deodand's biblical roots were eventually usurped and transformed
by the mid-nineteenth century "into a revenue-raising device for
the Crown."24
16. HOWARD E. WILLIAMS, ASSET FORFEITURE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE 8
(2002).
17. Exodus 21:28 (New American Standard Bible).
18. HENRY J. HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE
FROM SEIZURE? 17 (1995).
19. GURULt ET AL., supra note 13, at 4.
20. HOWARD E. WILLIAMS, ASSET FORFEITURE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE 8
(2002).
21. Id.
22. GREGORY M. VECCHI & ROBERT T. SIGLER, ASSETS FORFEITURE: A STUDY OF
POLICY AND ITS PRACTICE 42 (2001).
23. HYDE, supra note 18, at 18.
24. GURULt ET AL., supra note 13, at 8; see also Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W.
54, 55 (Tenn. 1916) ("Needless to say, historians record that the 'pious uses' under the con-
trol of the king and his almoner became a scandal which moderns would describe as being
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The notion that property could be guilty and subject to legal
proceedings was imilarly applied in early English statutory for-
feitures used to enforce the Navigation Acts of 1660.5 These laws
required that most commodities be transported in English ves-
sels.2" Illegally carried goods were subject to forfeiture and result-
ed in legal proceedings in the common law Court of the Excheq-
uer.2 7 These statutory forfeitures were most often enforced
against the offending ship or cargo under in rem procedures.2"
The principles of in rem jurisdiction allow the court to obtain ju-
risdiction against the property, rather than against the property
owner,29 thereby creating a legal fiction in which the property be-
comes party to the judicial proceedings. This fictitious assump-
tion, or legal sleight of hand, that the property itself could be
guilty of English customs and navigation laws, was similarly
adopted in early American jurisprudence."
Adoption of in rem jurisdiction was particularly important in
American admiralty law to allow for the forfeiture of ships and
cargo to enforce customs violations and to punish piracy when in
personam jurisdiction over property owners may have been im-
possible to establish.1 In two early 19th century Supreme Court
cases regarding the forfeiture of vessels whose crews were en-
gaged in piracy, the Court upheld the government's practice of
bringing civil forfeiture actions in rem against the vessels rather
than first obtaining in personam jurisdiction or a criminal convic-
tion of the owner.2 Recognizing that foreign owners of vessels
would otherwise not be held accountable, the Court noted that:
graft.").
25. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 612 (1993); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) ("English Law provided for statutory forfeitures of
offending objects used in violation of the customs and revenue laws-likely a product of
the confluence and merger of the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own
property could be denied the wrongdoer.")
26. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 612.
27. See HOWARD E. WILLIAMS, ASSET FORFEITURE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT
PERSPECTIVE 8 (2002).
28. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
29. Black's Law Dictionary defines in rem jurisdiction as "[a] court's power to adjudi-
cate the rights to a given piece of property, including the power to seize and hold it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
30. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 616.
31. GURULE ET AL., supra note 13, at 13; WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 9; see, e.g., Har-
mony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844).
32. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14-15 (1827); United States v. Cargo of the
Brig Malek Adhel, 42 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
20161
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It is not an uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law
of nations, to treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master
or crew thereof, a wrong or [offense] has been done as the offender,
without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or re-
sponsibility of the owner thereof. And this is done from the necessity
of the case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the [offense]
or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party. The doctrine
also is familiarly applied to cases of smuggling and other miscon-
duct.33
The courts allowed for this legal fiction of in rem proceedings in
which "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or
rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing"" as an ex-
traordinary measure when the courts lacked personal jurisdiction
over foreign owners of vessels.3" Similarly, Virginia's courts up-
held as constitutional statutory forfeiture provisions that were
not contingent on a criminal conviction, noting that the
property is unlawfully used by the owner himself, or by some other
person with whom he has intrusted it; that it is so used in violation
of law, and to the detriment of public and private interests, which
can only be effectually protected by confiscating the property itself as
the offender.36
Asset forfeiture laws were later expanded to include tax fraud
and criminal racketeering in the early 20th century.37 During the
prohibition era of the 1920s, the federal government also used as-
set forfeiture to enforce temperance laws3 8 and to combat illegal
distilleries.39
II. ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN VIRGINIA
Virginia's asset forfeiture laws developed piecemeal during the
20th century and have included provisions in the Alcoholic Bev-
erages Control Act and various sections of the criminal procedure
33. United States v. Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 42 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844).
34. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14 (1827).
35. See GURULt ET AL., supra note 13, at 14.
36. Boggs v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. 989, 995 (1882).
37. DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 23-24 (3d ed. 2014).
38. See generally, e.g., United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321 (1926);
Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530 (1926); Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Inno-
cence Lost: Bennis v. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition, 61 MO. L. REV. 593, 627
(1996) ("Prohibition brought forfeiture into common use in the United States.").
39. EDGEWORTH, supra note 37, at 23-24.
VIRGINIA'S CIVIL FORFEITURE LAW
and crimes and offenses titles of the Virginia Code. Numerous re-
visions, additions, and substitutions have scattered asset forfei-
ture provisions throughout the code in a confusing labyrinth of
laws.4"
A. Virginia Alcoholic Beverages Control Act
Virginia's Alcoholic Beverages Control Act, first adopted in
1934 and subsequently recodified and amended several times in
different forms, provides for the forfeiture of illegal "stills and
distilling apparatus and materials for the manufacture of alcohol-
ic beverages. '4' The provision also calls for the forfeiture of all
weapons used by or found on individuals engaged in the unlawful
manufacturing, transporting, or selling of alcoholic beverages,
and all vehicles used in the unlawful manufacturing of alcoholic
beverages that are "found in the immediate vicinity of any place
where alcoholic beverages are being unlawfully manufactured."42
The law provides that when items are seized under this provi-
sion, notice that the items were seized shall be provided by post-
ing a copy of the warrant "on the door of the buildings or room
where the articles were found, or if there is no door, then in any
conspicuous place upon the premises."" A hearing is held between
ten and thirty days after the warrant is returned to determine if
the seized items were used or possessed unlawfully.44 The owner
of the property or any person claiming an interest in the property
may appear at the hearing and file a written claim setting forth
his or her interest in the property. The code does not require a
criminal conviction to forfeit property under this section.45 All
items forfeited under this section are turned over to the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Board, and the net proceeds from the sale of
40. Warren Fiske, Proposals Delayed, But on the Way, POLITIFACT VIRGINIA (Oct. 3,
2011, 8:35 AM), http://www.politifact.con/virginia/promises/bob-o-meter/promise/1002/con
solidate-asset-forfeiture-laws/.
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-336 (Cum. Supp. 2015); 1934 Va. Acts 100, 105-06 (codified
as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-336 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-336 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
43. Id. § 4.1-338(B) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
44. Id.. § 4.1-338(C) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
45. Id.
2016]
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the forfeited items are paid into the state's Literary Fund, as re-
quired by the Virginia Constitution."
B. Civil Forfeiture for Property Connected to the Illegal
Distribution and Sale of Narcotics
The war on drugs ushered in a dramatic change to Virginia's
asset forfeiture scheme. Before a 1990 amendment o the Virginia
Constitution, all proceeds from assets forfeited to the Common-
wealth were constitutionally required to be paid to the Common-
wealth's Literary Fund.47 In 1990, as part of the war on drugs, the
Virginia Constitution was amended to allow for proceeds from
certain drug offenses to circumvent the Literary Fund and in-
stead be used to promote law enforcement." Specifically, the con-
stitutional provision provides:
The General Assembly may provide by general law an exemption
from this section for the proceeds from the sale of all property seized
and forfeited to the Commonwealth for a violation of the criminal
laws of this Commonwealth proscribing the manufacture, sale or dis-
tribution of a controlled substance or marijuana. Such proceeds shall
be paid into the state treasury and shall be distributed by law for the
purpose of promoting law enforcement.
49
Acting on this authority, the General Assembly amended the as-
set forfeiture provisions of the Virginia Code in 1991 to allow for
46. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-338(D) (Repl. Vol. 2010). Interest-
ingly, the code provides that if alcoholic beverages cannot be sold, the alcoholic beverages
may be gifted to mental health hospitals and elderly houses for medicinal purposes. Like-
wise, foodstuffs that cannot be sold but are usable may be gifted to local jails and correc-
tional facilities. VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-338(D) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
47. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8. "The Literary Fund is a permanent and perpetual school
fund established in the Constitution of Virginia. Revenues to the Literary Fund are de-
rived primarily from criminal fines, fees, and forfeitures, unclaimed and escheated proper-
ty, unclaimed lottery winnings and repayments of prior Literary Fund loans. The Literary
Fund provides low-interest loans for school construction, grants under the interest rate
subsidy program, debt service for technology funding, and support for the state's share of
teacher retirement required by the Standards of Quality." Literary Fund Loans, VA. DEP'T
OF EDUC., http://www.doe.virginia.gov/support/facilityconstruction/literary fund loans/
index.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-142 (Cum. Supp.
2015).
48. JOHN DINAN, THE VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION 208 (2014).
49. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8. This provision was ratified on November 6, 1990, and
became effective January 1, 1991.
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proceeds from drug-related forfeitures to flow back to the law en-
forcement agencies involved with the seizures and forfeitures of
the assets.50
The 1990 constitutional amendment and corresponding revi-
sion of the Virginia Code were proposed and adopted as a budget-
ary fix to combat drug trafficking by allowing law enforcement
agencies to keep the proceeds from the forfeiture of drug-related
assets.5" Before the constitutional amendment, law enforcement
agencies could use federal asset forfeiture procedures to bypass
the state requirement hat forfeiture proceeds be channeled to the
Literary Fund. Local law enforcement agencies rarely used Vir-
ginia's seizure and forfeiture laws, preferring instead to use the
federal drug asset forfeiture sharing regime.52 In 1988, federal
lawmakers proposed reforms requiring forfeitures under the fed-
eral system to follow state laws on the distribution of forfeiture
proceeds.53 Fearing a budgetary constraint, lawmakers in Rich-
mond pushed for a constitutional amendment that would allow
the forfeiture proceeds in state court to revert back to local law
enforcement efforts.4 The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District
of Virginia at the time, Henry E. Hudson, revealed the true intent
of the constitutional amendment when he said that the proposed
federal reforms "could have a dramatic effect on state and local
police who have harvested a great deal of money through this
program."5  By changing the Virginia Constitution, law enforce-
ment agencies were able to continue to "harvest" funds from civil
forfeiture.
Additionally, before the constitutional amendment, Virginia's
asset forfeiture scheme was rarely used in some localities due to
local court practices of requiring a criminal conviction before the
courts would entertain forfeiture proceedings." The amended for-
50. Id.; 1991 Va. Acts. 995-96; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.14 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
51. VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N, ASSET SEIZURE AND FORFEITURES, H. 60-7, Reg. Sess.,
at 2, 16-17 (Va. 1989).
52. Id. at 13-14.
53. Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Eco-
nomic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 107 (1998).
54. Robert F. Howe, Law Imperils Va. Drug Effort; Assets Seized in Investigations
Must Now Go to Literary Fund, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1989, at B3.
55. Id.
56. VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N, ASSET SEIZURE AND FORFEITURES, supra note 51, at 6.
Although a criminal conviction was not required, as a matter of law, the Virginia State
Crime Commission found that as a practical matter, courts in many jurisdictions required
2016]
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feiture provisions ended this bifurcated system and clearly pre-
scribed that civil asset forfeiture trials are independent of any
criminal proceeding and do not require a criminal conviction.
57
The Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police even opposed the
state law reforms enacted in 1990 and 1991 because, the chiefs
argued, the state asset forfeiture program would not work as fast
as the federal system.8
In conjunction with the constitutional amendment, the General
Assembly added Chapter 22.1 of Title 19.2 (Va. Code Ann. §§
19.2-386.1 et seq.) to provide specifically for the forfeiture of as-
sets related to drug cases. The "comprehensive drug forfeiture"
statute was adopted on the recommendation of the Virginia State
Crime Commission to clarify forfeiture procedures specifically for
drug-related forfeitures.59 It codified that "forfeiture is a civil pro-
ceeding independent of any criminal action" and explicitly set the
standard of proof as "a preponderance of the evidence.6 ' The
change in the allocation of proceeds from the Literary Fund to
law enforcement agencies, as well as the corresponding procedur-
al changes, drastically altered the landscape of civil asset forfei-
ture in Virginia and ushered in an era of aggressive forfeiture ac-
tions and the corresponding criticism illustrated in Part III.6"
C. 2012 Reforms
In addition to the provisions of Chapter 22.1 and the Alcohol
Beverages Control Act, the Virginia Code also included forfeiture
procedures for other crimes in Chapter 22.0 of Title 19.2. The
scattered forfeiture rules created several distinct sets of proce-
dures for civil asset forfeiture, depending on the underlying crim-
inal activity. In 2012, the General Assembly consolidated the pro-
cedures outlined in Title 19.2, repealed Chapter 22.0, and
adopted the drug-related forfeiture procedures of Chapter 22.1 as
a criminal conviction in order for the state to forfeit assets. Id.
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10(B) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
58. See Leslie Postal, Police Oppose Proposal: Many Dislike Plan to Return Drug As-
sets, DAILY PRESS (Jan. 24, 1991), http://articles.dailypress.com/1991-01-24/news/9101250
257_1_drug-raids-million-in-drug-assets-chiefs-association (explaining police chiefs' plans
to circumvent state law by using federal agents in raids as a result of their distaste for the
unnecessary delays created by the proposed legislation).
59. VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N, ASSET SEIZURE AND FORFEITURES, supra note 51, at 2.
60. Id.
61. See infra Part III.
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the default procedures for all forfeitures not otherwise specifically
provided by law.62 This newly renamed "Enforcement of Forfei-
tures" Chapter" was trumpeted by Delegate Jackson Miller as a
significant reform that "removes confusion for Virginia's law en-
forcement officials, Commonwealth's attorneys, judges, defense
attorneys, and citizens and ensures that criminal activity does
not pay for its perpetrators."64 Unfortunately, the reforms did lit-
tle to protect property rights or curb the potential abuse of power
permitted by, if not embodied in, the civil asset forfeiture scheme.
D. The Mechanics of Forfeiture: Chapter 22.1
The statutory procedures in Chapter 22.1 provide a fast and ef-
ficient means for the Commonwealth to confiscate and keep prop-
erty with limited protections to property owners. The Common-
wealth must prove the connection between the asset and the
offense only by a preponderance of the evidence.6" Once a court
makes that finding, the burden shifts to the claimant of the prop-
erty to prove that the claimant's interest in the property is ex-
empt from forfeiture.6
After each seizure, the law enforcement agency must notify the
Commonwealth's Attorney in writing.6" The Commonwealth's At-
torney has twenty-one days to file a notice of seizure with the
clerk of the court, which, inter alia, specifically describes the
property seized and identifies all owners and lienholders.6 s The
62. 2012 Va. Acts 473, 476 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.1 (Repl.
Vol. 2015)).
63. Id.
64. Dan Telvock, Gov. McDonnell Signs Public Safety Bills in Stafford, PATCH.COM
(July 18, 2012), http://patch.comlvirginia/fredericksburg/gov-mcdonnell.signs-public-safe
ty-bills-in-stafford.
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015). The statutory provisions for
whether property is subject to forfeiture depend on the nature of the property and of the
criminal act and are still codified in provisions scattered throughout the criminal code and
in Chapter 22.2. Id. § 19.2-386.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
66. Id. § 19.2-386.10 (A) (Repl. Vol. 2015). The code provides several exceptions: an
owner or lienholder's interest may not be forfeited if the court finds that the owner or
lienholder "did not know and had no reason to know of the conduct giving rise to the forfei-
ture," or if the owner or lienholder "was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice."
Id. § 19.2-386.8 (Repl. Vol. 2015). Additionally, if "the conduct giving rise to forfeiture oc-
curred without" the owner or lienholder's expressed or implied consent or connivance, then
the property may not be forfeited. Id.
67. Id. § 19.2-386.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015). The timeframe for notifying the Common-
wealth is not specified and merely requires that it take place "forthwith." Id.
68. Id.
2016]
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clerk then mails notice of the seizure to the last known address of
all identified owners and lienholders.69 Within ninety days of the
written notice by law enforcement (and within three years of the
"actual discovery by the Commonwealth of the last act giving rise
to the forfeiture,7) the Commonwealth's attorney must file an in-
formation, which commences the judicial action against the seized
property.7' The information describes the property, names the
known owners or lienholders of the property, and states the
grounds for the forfeiture.2 It also asks that all persons concerned
or interested be notified to appear and show cause why the prop-
erty should not be forfeited.3
Both the notice of seizure and the information are designed to
"protect[ ] the property rights of the property owners or lienhold-
ers who have an interest in the seized property.74 Still, failure by
the Commonwealth to file a notice of seizure with the clerk of the
court within twenty-one days does not deprive the Circuit Court
of jurisdiction.75 If the Commonwealth fails to file an information
within ninety days, however, the property is released to the own-
er or the lien holder.76 This ninety-day period allows for the prop-
erty to "be seized and secured for criminal investigative purpos-
es."
77
After the Commonwealth files an information, the clerk of the
court "shall forthwith mail by first-class mail notice of seizure for
forfeiture to the last known address of all identified owners and
lien holders. ' All identified owners and lien holders are served
with a copy of the information and notice to appear, in accordance
with the same service procedures generally used for all civil ac-
tions.79 Virginia's civil process procedures require service on the
69. Id.
70. Id. § 19.2-386.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
71. Id. § 19.2-386.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
72. Id. § 19.2-386.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
73. Id.
74. Commonwealth v. Wilks, 530 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2000).
75. Id.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015). Additionally, if the Common-
wealth fails to file within ninety days, courts lose jurisdiction over the forfeiture. Com-
monwealth v. Brunson, 448 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1994).
77. Mallory v. City of Richmond, No. CH-05-688, 2005 WL 2548494, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 23, 2005).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
79. Id. § 19.2-386.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2015); Id. § 8.01-296 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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individual or substituted service if the person is not found at his
usual place of abode.80
Within thirty days of receiving service of the notice, the proper-
ty owner must file an answer to demonstrate why the property
should not be forfeited.8" The answer should, inter alia, clearly set
forth the owner's right of ownership and "the reason, cause, ex-
ception or defense he may have against the forfeiture of the prop-
erty."82 An owner who does not file an answer will be found in de-
fault.
83
After property is seized, the Commonwealth may return the
property to the owner if the attorney for the Commonwealth be-
lieves that the property is exempt from forfeiture. But even this
provision, which seems designed to protect the interest of proper-
ty owners, requires that the property owner first pay "costs inci-
dent to the custody of the seized property. "
84
E. Crimes Punishable by Forfeiture
Although Virginia's current asset forfeiture scheme was first
adopted for the seizure of assets related to narcotics possession
and distribution, the law has been expanded to allow for the for-
feiture of assets related to numerous other criminal acts. For ex-
ample, moneys and property that are used in "substantial connec-
tion with an act of terrorism," including interest or profits derived
from such invests, are subject to forfeiture.85 The computers used
and profits derived from violations of the Virginia Computer
80. Id. § 8.01-296(2) (Repl. Vol. 2015). As in most other states, substitute service can
be achieved by delivering the documentation with another family member who is sixteen
years or older and lives at the house, or by posting a copy of the process at the front door
and mailing copies of the documents at least ten days before judgment by default may be
entered. Id. If neither of these substitute service options can be effected, then service can
be performed by order of publication. Id. § 8.01-296(3) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
81. Id. § 19.2-386.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015); see also id. § 19.2-386.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015). (The
information shall "ask that all persons concerned or interested be notified to appear and
show cause why such property should not be forfeited.")
82. Id. § 19.2-386.9; see also id. § 19.2-386.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015) (using similar language
to describe what the answer should state).
83. Id. § 19.2-386.10 (Repl. Vol. 2015). A property owner can obtain possession of the
property while the matter is pending before the court by posting a bond. VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-386.6 (Repl. Vol. 2015). If the owner fails to file an answer and is found in default, the
code provides an owner one last chance to prove one of the exceptions to the Department of
Criminal Justice Services. Id.§ 19.2-386.10 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
84. Id. § 19.2-386.5 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
85. Id. § 19.2-386.15 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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Crimes Act, including embezzlement using a computer,6 sending
spai emails,"7 and using a computer to gather identifying infor-
mation by trickery or deception," are subject to forfeiture." Vir-
ginia's forfeiture laws are also used to combat money launder-
ing, ° illegal gambling,9 and bribery of government officials, 2 by
making the profits and moneys obtained from the illegal acts sub-
ject to forfeiture.
Vehicles that are knowingly used for the transpiration of stolen
goods valued at over $200 or any property stolen as a result of
robbery (regardless of the value) are subject to forfeiture.93 Motor
vehicles are also subject to forfeiture if the vehicle is used by the
owner or with his knowledge during the commission or attempted
commission of abduction of a minor or prostitution of a minor."
Similarly, vehicles are subject to forfeiture if used "during the
commission of, or in an attempt to commit a second or subsequent
offense" of certain sex crimes.98 Finally, vehicles are subject to for-
feiture for felony violations of the state's driving while intoxicated
law, unless an immediate family member of the defendant can
prove that a significant hardship to the family will result if the
vehicle is confiscated.9"
In 2014, the General Assembly again expanded the number of
crimes that can result in asset forfeiture. Under this most recent
law, police may seize the person or real property involved in the
crime of attempting to solicit a prostitute.7 Thus, if a law en-
forcement agency were to set up an operation in which they post-
ed a fake online advertisement for prostitution services and a
person answered that ad from his or her own house, police could
seize the house and keep it upon obtaining a conviction.
86. See id. § 18.2-152.3 (2) (Supp. 2015).
87. See id. § 18.2-152.3:1(A)(1) (Supp. 2015).
88. See id. § 18.2-152.5:1(A) (Supp. 2015).
89. See id. § 19.2-386.17 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
90. See id. § 19.2-386.19 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
91. See id. § 19.2-386.30 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
92. See id. § 2.2-3124 (Supp. 2015).
93. See id. § 19.2-386.16(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015). The vehicle forfeiture procedure that
was previously contained in the Alcoholic Beverages Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-340 (Repl.
Vol. 1993), was repealed in 2012. 2012 Va. Acts 1609, 1614, 1618.
94. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.16(B) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
95. Id. § 19.2-386.16(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
96. See id. § 19.2-386.34 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
97. See id. § 19.2-386.35 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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The revenue generated from these non-drug-related forfeitures
goes to the Commonwealth's Literary Fund and does not revert
back to the localities.98 A 2015 Virginia State Crime Commission
report noted that data collection for non-drug related forfeitures
"is not captured in a reliable, transparent manner."99 In a
statewide survey, Crime Commission staff were unable to deter-
mine how much cash had been forfeited to the state this way and
for which crimes, though fifteen law enforcement agencies report-
ed non-drug related forfeiture amounts in fiscal year 2014 that
totaled $159,972."'°
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF VIRGINIA'S DRUG-RELATED ASSET
FORFEITURE SCHEME
Much like the deodand of English common law, Virginia's drug-
related civil asset forfeiture scheme can fairly be viewed as a
means to fill the coffers of struggling localities rather than a tool
to combat the scourge of predatory drug dealers. By allowing as-
set forfeitures from drug cases to bypass the Literary Fund and
instead to fund state or local law enforcement agencies,1' the
General Assembly created a profit incentive for law enforcement
agencies to prioritize seizure of drug-related assets over other po-
licing initiatives. Limited safeguards for property owners stack
the deck for the government to keep seized property and make it
difficult for property owners to fight to keep their property. The
vast sums of money and assets seized by law enforcement in Vir-
ginia encourage corruption or prosecutorial abuse.
A. A System Ripe for Abuse
According to a comprehensive study published by the Institute
for Justice in 2010 that analyzed the civil asset forfeiture laws of
all fifty states, Virginia's forfeiture laws (along with Georgia,
Michigan, Texas, and West Virginia) received the worst ranking
for potential forfeiture abuse and poor property owner protec-
98. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.14 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
99. VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N, ASSET FORFEITURE (SB 6841HB 1287) 86 (Oct. 27,
2015), http://vscc.virginia.gov/Asset%20Forfeiture-FINAL- 1.pdf.
100. See id. at 84.
101. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.14 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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tion.1°2 The report specifically cited the low burden of proof re-
quired of the government for the forfeiture of property and the
burden on owners to establish their own innocence.0 3 By holding
the proceedings in civil court rather than criminal court, Virginia
has created a system that allows for the forfeiture of property un-
der a significantly lower standard of proof than is required for a
criminal conviction. Whereas a criminal conviction requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, °4 the Commonwealth must merely
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property
is related to a crime and subject to forfeiture.'0 5
Echoing the Institute for Justice report, a Richmond Times-
Dispatch editorial noted, "the system remains ripe for abuse."'06
At times, the moneys have been used for inappropriate and po-
tentially unconstitutional activities.'7 In addition, limited over-
sight has also incentivized law enforcement agencies to engage in
criminal embezzlement.
In Loudoun County, Sheriff Steve Simpson used proceeds from
asset forfeiture for what appeared to be self-promoting causes ra-
ther than "promoting law enforcement," as required by the Vir-
ginia Constitution.' He used proceeds to rebrand a privately de-
veloped computer software program (the "ComputerCOP"
program) with his picture and a personal message "from the sher-
iff."' 09 The Sheriffs Office then distributed the ComputerCOP
program to families in Loudoun County to allow parents to moni-
102. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 10, at 96. A subsequent assessment by the Institute
for Justice rendered a similarly dire assessment: Virginia received another D- grade, while
only two states (Mass. and N.D.) received an F. DICK M. CARPENTER ET AL., INST. FOR
JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 22 (2d ed. Nov.
2015).
103. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 10, at 96.
104. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); Green v. Young, 571 S.E.2d
135, 138 (Va. 2002); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-258.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015) (requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt for traffic infractions).
105. VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-386.10 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
106. Editorial, Law Enforcement: Inexcusable, supra note 1.
107. See Crystal Owens, Law Enforcement Distributed Software Puts Personal Data at
Risk, Report Alleges, LOUDOUN TIMES-MIRROR (Oct. 3, 2014), http:/www/loudountimes.
com/news/article/law-enforcementdistributedsoftware-puts-personaldataat riskreport_
alle898.
108. Id.; see VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
109. Loudoun Co. Parents Have New Tool in Internet Safety, NBC WASHINGTON (Oct.
19, 2011), www.nbcwashington.com/news/localLoudoun-Co-Parents-Have-New-Tool-in-In
ternet-Safety-132205833.html.
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tor and block their children's internet activity.' ° In a nationwide
study, the Electronic Frontier Foundation concluded that "Com-
puterCOP is actually just spyware" with significant security is-
sues that leave everyone using the program exposed.1 '
In 2010, the Department of Criminal Justice Services repri-
manded the Richmond Police Department for spending several
thousand dollars in forfeiture funds to buy birthday gifts for em-
ployees.'2 In 2009, the city manager of Norfolk publicly criticized
Police Chief Bruce Marquis for spending $3,000 in forfeiture
funds to buy coffee mugs as gifts for attendees of a conference for
law enforcement executives.'3
There is also limited accountability in some jurisdictions over
the money provided to the local law enforcement agencies. An in-
vestigation by the Virginia State Police into the embezzlement
and misappropriation of forfeiture funds by Halifax County Sher-
iff Stanley Noblin revealed that the Sheriff appeared to have
broad authority to access the funds with little oversight, and no
outside authorization required."4 While the Criminal Justice
Board recommends that localities require a prosecutor or partner-
ing law enforcement agency to co-authorize withdrawals of cash
used in drug busts and other investigations, Halifax County did
not require such co-authorization. "' According to local news ac-
counts, from May 2009 to March 2011, Sheriff Noblin withdrew
about $48,500 from the asset forfeiture funds for undercover drug
buys, informant tips, and testimony."' These cash withdrawals,
among other allegations, prompted the Virginia State Police to
investigate alleged embezzlement charges against the sheriff."'
110. Owens, supra note 107.
111. Dave Maass, ComputerCOP: The Dubious 'Internet Safety Software' That Hun-
dreds of Police Agencies Have Distributed to Families, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 1,
2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/computercop-dangerous-internet-safety-softw
are-hundreds-police-agencies.
112. Editorial, Law Enforcement: Inexcusable, supra note 1.
113. Harry Minium Jr., Norfolk Police Chief's Fund-Raising Is Investigated, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT (Aug. 14, 2009), http://pilotonline.com/news/norfolk-police-chief-s-fund-raising-is-
investigatedlarticle-a274d4db-c5ac-5462-bd68-8 lb74ee4117e.html.
114. Tom McLaughlin, Cash on Hand: Not Just Noblin, SOVANOW.COM (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.sovanow.com/index.php?/news/article/cash-onhand-notjust-noblin/; Doug
Ford, Noblin Pleads Guilty, UNION STAR (July 23, 2013), http://www.theunionstar.com/
article_88ac86ca-f3a6-1 le2-aca5-0019bb2963f4.html.
115. McLaughlin, supra note 114.
116. Id.
117. Tom McLaughlin, State Police Search Halifax County Sheriff's Office, Vehicle,
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According to an affidavit filed by the Virginia State Police inves-
tigator, there were no records in ledgers or bank statements to
account for the use of the cash withdrawals, and during the same
period Sheriff Noblin deposited thousands of dollars in cash into
bank accounts under his exclusive control.118
Former Middlesex County Sheriff Guy Abbott also misappro-
priated money from the sheriffs office's asset forfeiture fund from
2003 to 2008.119 In August 2012, he was found guilty of using as-
set forfeiture funds to bribe two of his subordinates. During Ab-
bott's trial, the judge struck several counts of misusing forfeiture
funds to procure two boats and hand out "Christmas bonuses" to
twenty-one employees, on the grounds that the money spent
"could be viewed as related to law enforcement purposes."'20
B. The Profit Incentive
Returning money to localities also creates an incentive for
elected Commonwealth's Attorneys to turn asset forfeiture into a
political platform, and reinforces the perception that it is used
primarily as a means to fund cash-strapped law enforcement
agencies."' Arthur Goff, the Rappahannock County Common-
wealth's Attorney, defends the use of drug-related asset forfei-
tures as "important sources of funding for the policing of drug
dealing, and help to relieve the burden on taxpayers."'22 Likewise,
SOVANOW.COM (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.sovanow.com/index.php?/news/article/state-pol
icesearchsheriff_noblins_office-vehicle/.
118. Id.
119. Matt Sabo, Former Middlesex Sheriff Guilty on Two Bribery Counts, DAILY PRESS
(Aug. 15, 2012), http://articles.dailypress.com/2012-08-15/news/dp-nws-middlesex-abbott-
trial-day5-wrap-0816- 20120815l-sheriff-guy-abbott-judge-paul-f-sheridan-bribery-convic
tion.
120. Matt Sabo, Judge Throws out 10 Felony Counts Against Former Middlesex Sheriff,
DAILY PRESS (Aug. 14, 2012), http://articles.dailypress.com/2012-08-14/news/dp-nws-
middlesex-abbott-trial-day4-wrap-0815-20120814 1_sheriff-guy-abbott-middlesex-sheriff-
judge-paul-f-sheridan.
121. See, e.g., Debra McCown, Nicole Price Seeking GOP Nomination for Washington
County Commonwealth's Attorney, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER (May 23, 2011), http://www.
tricities.com/news/articlea66d8ced-7377-548f-a0cf-3979ac50a9b7.html (noting that if
elected, Price "would "take advantage of alternative revenue sources, such as forfeiture
assets"); Vince Donaghue for Essex County Commonwealth's Attorney, http://www.vince
forca.com/issues.htm (pledging to use that office to "aggressively pursue asset forfeitures
for Essex County") (last visited March 7, 2016).
122. Arthur L. Goff, Letter: Commonwealth's Attorney Clarifies Asset Forfeiture,
RAPPNEWS.COM (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.rappnews.com/2015/10/08fletter-commonweal
ths-attorney-clarifies-asset-forfeiture/145090/.
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Amanda McDonald Wiseley, a candidate for Shenandoah County
Commonwealth's Attorney, proposed pursuing asset forfeitures
more aggressively to "offset some costs to the taxpayers.123
The revenue-raising incentives of the current drug-related as-
set forfeiture scheme also create a conflict of interest between
revenue generation for police departments and strategic narcotics
policing, resulting in distorted prioritization by some law en-
forcement agencies and individual officers. Given the potential
windfall, police administrators can be enticed easily to prioritize
targeting revenue-bearing criminal activity.
This is not merely a theoretical hypothesis made by asset for-
feiture critics, but has been substantiated with both ethnographic
studies of police departments engaged in asset forfeiture and by
economic analyses of crime data for law enforcement agencies
that retain profits from seized assets and those that do not. In a
1994 study published in Justice Quarterly, researchers docu-
mented police officers targeting lesser value, first-time drug deal-
ers in order to seize vehicles, rather than apprehend asset-poor
drug dealers slinging significantly larger quantities of narcotics.'24
A study published by economists from the American Enterprise
Institute and Florida State University raised similar concerns
and revealed that those agencies that retain drug-related assets
disproportionately allocate resources to narcotics policing.'2' Con-
trolling for drug usage, the study found that "[l]egislation permit-
ting police to keep a portion of seized assets raises drug arrests as
a portion of total arrests by about 20 percent and drug arrest
rates by about 18 percent. '
The purpose of asset forfeiture as a strategic drug-supply re-
duction tool and crime deterrent has been altered by the revenue-
raising goal. Asset forfeiture is no longer viewed primarily as a
strategic tool to combat narcotics distribution. Instead, "the moti-
123. Preston Knight & Sally Voth, Sparks Fly in Final Week of Shenandoah County
Prosecutor's Race, NORTHERN VIRGINIA DAILY (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.nvdaily.com/new
s/201 1/1l/sparks-fly-in-final-week-of-shenandoah-county-prosecutors-race/; Sally Voth,
Commonwealth's Attorney Candidates Face Off, NORTHERN VIRGINIA DAILY (July 25,
2011), http://www.nvdaily.com/news/2011/07/commonwealths-attorney-candidates-face-of
fV.
124. See J. Mitchell Miller & Lance H. Selva, Drug Enforcement's Double-Edged Sword:
An Assessment of Asset Forfeiture Programs, 11 JUST. Q. 313, 325 (1994).
125. Brent D. Mast et al., Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy, 104
PUB. CHOICE 285, 301 (2000).
126. Id. at 301-03.
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vation for law enforcement agencies to pursue forfeiture has be-
come that it serves the institutional interests in self-
perpetuation, with the possible collateral benefit of helping to
fight drug crime."'27
Over the last decade, law enforcement agencies in Virginia
have received $32,561,236 in drug-related asset forfeitures
through the state's asset forfeiture program.2 ' As illustrated by
Table 1, all parts of the state's asset forfeiture program have in-
creased significantly from 2006 to 2015. The vast majority of the
seized assets are motor vehicles and currency, accounting for 89%
of all items seized between fiscal years 2010 and 2015.129 Certain
localities were able to supplement their budgets with windfall
one-day hauls of hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash. For ex-
ample, the Henrico Police Department seized about $725,000 of
cash in one day in March 2009.130 The City of Newport News simi-
larly added to the Police Department and Sheriffs Department's
budgets in May 2011 with two hauls equaling more than half a
million dollars.'31
127. William P. Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered?
Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeitures, 80
CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1327 (1992).
128. STATE CRIME COMM'N, ASSET FORFEITURE (SB 684/HB 1287) 75 (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://vscc.virginia.gov/Asset%20ForfeitureFINAL-l.pdf. These figures do not include as-
sets received through the federal government's equitable sharing program, which total
more than $107 million for the 2004-14 period. Id. at 71.
129. Id. at 75.
130. Dep't of Crim. Just. Serv. Property Nos. 09-FS11205-01 and 09-FS11206-01 (data
compiled by ACLU of Virginia through Freedom of Information Act requests).
131. Dep't of Crim. Just. Serv. Property Nos. 11-FS17801-01 and 12-FS31202-05 (data
compiled by ACLU of Virginia through Freedom of Information Act requests).
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Table 1: Value of Asset Forfeitures in Virginia13 '
Fiscal Year Total Items Value of Items Total Disburse-
Seized Seized ments
2006 189 $639,152 $110,899
2007 219 $991,263 $235,460
2008 365 $2,020,786 $266,128
2009 582 $2,639,639 $780,855
2010 2,464 $10,134,559 $4,957,627
2011 2,346 $10,258,608 $5,350,350
2012 2,457 $11,576,315 $5,820,171
2013 2,369 $11,546,672 $5,253,183
2014 2,412 $10,624,949 $4,185,594
2015 2,123 $10,250,119 $5,600,969
TOTAL 15,526 $70,682,062 $32,561,236
Virginia's drug-related forfeiture laws have shifted from what
was proposed as a benign revenue-raising mechanism to help
fund local law enforcement agencies into a potentially corruption-
inducing scheme used to "harvest" funds. The need to fund law
enforcement should not override corruption concerns and due
process failures. As the Richmond Times-Dispatch noted, "[i]f po-
lice departments around the state lack sufficient resources, then
their city councils and boards of supervisors are falling down on
the job. Local governments should raise the funds needed to pay
for local services, including law enforcement-the most important
local service of all." 1
33
132. VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N, ASSET FORFEITURE (SB 684/HB 1287) 75 (Oct. 27,
2015), http://vscc.virginia.gov/Asset%20ForfeitureFINAL-l.pdf. Data for FY 2015 was
collected through Sept. 8, 2015. Id.
133. Editorial, Law Enforcement: Inexcusable, supra note 1.
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IV. PROPOSED REFORMS
Much of the criticism levied against Virginia's civil asset forfei-
ture scheme, specifically the scheme for forfeiture of drug-related
assets, can be negated by implementing several simple reforms.
Four reforms are essential to improving Virginia's current
scheme: (1) the requirement of a criminal conviction for all asset
forfeitures; (2) the elimination of the profit incentive for law en-
forcement agencies; (3) limits on the ability of law enforcement
agencies to forum shop in federal court; and (4) increased ac-
countability through improved reporting requirements for locali-
ties that collect forfeitures. In the alternative, if Virginia cannot
summon the will to make these substantial reforms, it must at a
bare minimum increase the burden of proof in civil asset forfei-
ture actions.
A. Require a Criminal Conviction for All Forfeitures
The first reform is to tie the forfeiture of assets to criminal
prosecution. Allowing for forfeiture in civil court without any cor-
responding criminal charges, let alone conviction, is anathema to
fundamental notions of justice. Virginia should require the stay of
all asset forfeiture proceedings until a finding of guilt is entered
on the alleged offense that prompted the seizure. The Common-
wealth should first have to secure a criminal conviction, and then
use the conviction as a basis for criminal forfeiture proceedings.
Advocates for civil asset forfeiture claim that asset forfeiture
laws are needed to dismantle drug rings by not only targeting the
criminal actors but also the criminal enterprise. This argument
fails, however, because the goal can still be achieved by tying the
asset forfeiture to the criminal prosecution. Criminal forfeiture,
not civil forfeiture, should become the norm.
As Congress recognized when it reformed federal asset forfei-
ture laws in 2000,13 removing assets without criminal prosecu-
tions will not cease drug activity.135 Congressman Henry Hyde
134. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114
Stat. 202 (2000) (codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. § 981 (2012)).
135. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hid-
den Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 37 (1998) (noting the "extraordinary failure"
of the war on drugs despite "record numbers of drug seizures, asset forfeitures, and prose-
cutions."); Alison R. Solomon, Drugs and Money: How Successful Is the Seizure and Forfei-
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noted that "[i]n more than 80 percent of asset forfeiture cases the
property owner is not even charged with a crime, yet the govern-
ment officials can and usually do keep the seized property."3 '
While similar data is not available in Virginia, the current
scheme allows for comparable abuse of forfeiture laws. In Rich-
mond, civil forfeiture cases are generally brought in conjunction
with criminal charges.'37 Such practices, however, are at the dis-
cretion of each Commonwealth's Attorney. Virginia should follow
the lead of other states ' and require that a defendant be convict-
ed of an underlying or related criminal action in order for proper-
ty to be subject to forfeiture.
The nebulous realm of civil asset forfeiture and the legal fiction
created to justify its use have resulted in a twisted logic to re-
move procedural safeguards that are fundamental to the Ameri-
can criminal justice system. Although the stated targets of asset
forfeiture are "criminals and their associates,"'39 the Virginia
courts have noted that,
Forfeiture is, however, not a criminal proceeding but a "civil" action
against "res" unlawfully employed by its owner or other person. Alt-
hough related to criminal activity, forfeiture is neither "penalty" nor
"punishment" for an offense and remains entirely separate and dis-
tinct from a prosecution of its owner or other individual.
1 40
ture Program at Raising Revenue and Distributing Proceeds?, 42 EMORY L.J. 1149, 1188-
89 (1993) (noting that "[t]he government does not appear to be any closer to winning the
drug war with forfeiture than it was without it."). As the first article, in particular, sug-
gests, there is good reason to doubt that criminal prosecutions of drug offenses are a useful
enterprise at all. The efficacy of the American war on drugs is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle.
136. HYDE, supra note 18, at 6.
137. See Jim Nolan, New Drug-War Tack in Richmond, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (June
11, 2007), http://www.richmond.com/news/article_4654e3f5-21d3-5bec-ac31-fe48b6ac33b4.
html.
138. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4 (LexisNexis 2016) (providing that "[a] person's
property is subject to forfeiture if ... the person is convicted by a criminal court of the of-
fense"); 2015 MONT. LAWS 421 (providing that "a court may not order forfeiture of real or
personal property of any kind.. . unless: (a) the owner of the property has been convicted
of a criminal offense"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11488.4(i)(3) (Deering 2016) (re-
quiring that as a condition precedent to a forfeiture action, the subject of the forfeiture "be
convicted in an underlying or related criminal action of an offense .. . [that] occurred with-
in five years of the seizure" or within five years of the notice to seek forfeiture).
139. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OVERVIEW OF ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM, http://www.jus
tice.gov/jmd/afp/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
140. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d 841, 842 (Va. App. 1991) (internal citations
omitted).
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The strained reasoning required to create the legal fiction of in
rem jurisdiction for asset forfeiture makes a mockery of forfeiture
jurisprudence. The Virginia legislature and the courts have cre-
ated an absurd reality, sanctioning the confiscation of property
related to criminal conduct yet denying that the forfeiture is pun-
ishment for crimes committed. Treating forfeiture as a pseudo
non-punishment opens the door to disregard of due process con-
cerns and property rights. This door can easily be shut, and prop-
erty rights reaffirmed, by linking asset forfeiture to the criminal
justice system.
In 2015, legislation was proposed to require a criminal convic-
tion for asset forfeitures in Virginia.'' House Bill 1287, intro-
duced by Delegate Mark Cole, would have required a stay of all
forfeiture proceedings "until conviction" of the offense authorizing
the forfeiture and "the exhaustion of all appeals.'42 The bill
passed the House 92-6,'1" but died in the Senate Finance Com-
mittee.'44 Delegate Cole reintroduced similar legislation for the
2016 session.'45 House Bill 48, which would have required a stay
of forfeiture proceedings until the owner of the property is found
guilty, 4 6 was defeated on a 50-47 vote. Senator Chap Petersen
filed similar legislation in the Senate,47 but the Senate Finance
Committee did not approve it. Senator Petersen later brought the
issue to a floor vote by amending another asset forfeiture bill, but
the measure failed, 24-16.141
141. H.B. 1287, Va. Gen. Assemb. (Reg. Sess. 2015); S.B. 684, Va. Gen. Assemb. (Reg.
Sess. 2015). The Senate bill was withdrawn at the request of the patron.
142. H.B. 1287, Va. Gen. Assemb. (Reg. Sess. 2015).
143. Morgan White, Asset Forfeiture Reforms Pass the House, FREE LANCE-STAR (Feb.
6, 2015), http://www.fredericksburg.com/news/local/asset-forfeiture-reforms-pass-the-hou
se/article-b9a49cec-b595-5271-85f9-1444e3fba29e.html.
144. Patrick Wilson, Senate Committee Kills Police Asset Forfeiture Bill, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.pilotonline.com/news/government/politics/virginia/sen
ate-committee-kills-police-asset-forfeiture-bill/article_7788394 1-f509-50cb-b222-74a6777a
4d62.html.
145. Mike Maharrey, Virginia Bill Would Curb "Policing for Profit" via Asset Forfei-
ture, But Federal Loophole Remains, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR. (Nov. 30, 2015), http://
blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2015/11/virginia-bill-would-curb-policing-for-profit-via- as
set-forfeiture-but-federal-loophole-remains/.
146. H.B. 48, Va. Gen. Assemb. (Reg. Sess. 2016), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp
604.exe?161+sum+HB48.
147. S.B. 108, Va. Gen. Assemb. (Reg. Sess. 2016), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-binlegp
604.exe?161+sum+SB 108.
148. S.B. 457, Va. Gen. Assemb. (Reg. Sess. 2016), http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/leg p
604.exe?161+vot+SV0398SB0457+SB0457.
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B. Eliminate the Profit Incentive for Law Enforcement Agencies
The biggest reform needed to ensure trust in the asset forfei-
ture program is to eliminate the profit incentive for law enforce-
ment agencies to target certain crimes and properties. The gov-
ernment's pecuniary interest in seizing assets gives the
appearance-and sometimes creates the reality-that asset for-
feiture is more of a police fund raiser than a legitimate drug en-
forcement tool. As one law enforcement official stated, "[i]n tight
budget periods, and even in times of budget surpluses, using as-
set forfeiture dollars to purchase equipment and training to stay
current with the ever-changing trends in crime fighting helps
serve and protect the citizens."'49 The Virginia State Police alone
received asset forfeitures totaling $44 million from a 2007 settle-
ment, as a reward for its role in a three-year investigation.'50 The
agency used the funds to complete a driving track, build a new fo-
rensics laboratory, update and expand its communications net-
works, and make capital improvements to its aviation program,
among other items.'
So "long as these incentives remain, law enforcement agents
are motivated by profit; they lose sight of the due process and
private property rights principles involved."'52 Even law enforce-
ment officials have admitted that monetary gains cloud the forfei-
ture system. The director of the Department of Justice's Asset
Forfeiture Office under the George H.W. Bush Administration
stated, "[w]e had a situation in which the desire to deposit money
into the asset forfeiture fund became the reason for being of for-
feiture, eclipsing in certain measure the desire to effect fair en-
forcement of the laws."'153
149. Robert O'Harrow Jr. et al., Asset Seizures Fuel Police Spending, WASH. POST (Oct.
11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/cash-seizures-fuel-
police-spending/.
150. Virginia State Police Dedicate State-of-the-Art Driver Training Complex, KBS
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.kbsgc.com/news/virginia-state-police.dedicate-state-of-the-art-
driver-training-complex/.
151. Drugmaker Settlement Money, WHSV3 (Oct. 5, 2007), http://www.whsv.com/home
/headlines/10264422.html.
152. Kasey L. Higgins, Comment, "Shiver Me Timbers!" Civil Asset Forfeiture: Crime
Deterrent or Incentive for the Government o Pillage and Plunder Property?, 4 PHOENIX L.
REV. 771, 795 (2011).
153. HYDE, supra note 18, at 29.
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The purchase of needed equipment, protective gear, computers,
and vehicles should not rely on raising funds from property sei-
zures. Even if municipal budgets do not explicitly account for for-
feiture proceeds, the dialogue in political campaigns for more ag-
gressive forfeiture programs gives the perception that police
priorities are set by the potential financial gains. Instead, the
money should revert back to the Literary Fund or should go di-
rectly to providing for victims of crimes and rehabilitative pro-
grams for offenders. In Pennsylvania, forfeiture proceeds are used
for drug abuse programs and the witness relocation and protec-
tion programs.' This allows for the proceeds to remain in the
criminal justice system without the perverse incentive of the law
enforcement agency to receive profits for their policing endeavors.
C. Limit Access to Equitable Sharing and Federal Adoptive
Forfeitures
Unfortunately, as procedures for asset forfeitures under Virgin-
ia law become less enticing to law enforcement than federal pro-
cedures, localities will likely forum shop to federal court. 5' Under
the federal equitable sharing program, a participating state or lo-
cal law enforcement agency may petition a federal agency to as-
sist either through a joint investigation or by federal adoption of a
local or state seizure.156 So long as the property is subject to forfei-
ture under federal law, a federal agency such as the FBI, DEA, or
ATF may assist with the forfeiture.57 In adoptive forfeitures, the
federal government will generally return 80% of the proceeds to
the local or state law enforcement agency that requested the as-
sistance.5 ' The federal equitable sharing program has expanded
rapidly: the Department of Justice paid $681 million to state and
local law enforcement agencies in fiscal year 2012, up from $440
million in 2011.159
154. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6801(h) (West 2006).
155. See Frans J. von Kaenel, Missouri Ups the Ante in the Drug Forfeiture "Race to the
Res," 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1469 (1994) (noting that state and local law enforcement
agencies are the principal beneficiaries of the "federal forfeiture bounty.").
156. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 6 (Apr. 2009).
157. Id. at 1-2.
158. Id. at 12.
159. Michael E. Horowitz, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the
Department of Justice-2013, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (Dec. 11, 2013), http:/!
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In other states that have attempted to tighten their asset for-
feiture laws, state and local law enforcement agencies have in-
creasingly turned to federal equitable sharing. Missouri first en-
acted asset forfeiture reforms in 1993,60 with the goals of limiting
abuse, ending participation in federal adoptive forfeitures, and
increasing the state's share of forfeiture assets relative to the fed-
eral government."' A 1999 report by the state auditor found that
85% of all forfeitures in Missouri still went through the federal
government.'62 In 2001, the state legislature passed a new reform
bill, this time with the goals of eliminating both the profit incen-
tive and the circumvention of a state law that requires forfeited
assets to be deposited into the state's education fund.'63 Yet by
2008, Missouri law enforcement agencies were taking in more for-
feiture dollars-more than $10 million in fiscal year 2008-than
they did before the 2001 reforms.
6
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Reforms in other states suggest, however, that ties to equitable
sharing can be cut. The federal government suspended Oregon
and Utah from the equitable sharing program after those states
passed reforms that forced asset forfeiture funds out of law en-
forcement budgets.165 City council members in the District of Co-
lumbia, who recently passed similar reforms, noted that the pos-
sibility of getting suspended from equitable sharing is a "benefit
of the legislation, not a detriment.'66
The federal equitable sharing program recently encountered a
stumbling block: in December 2015, the Department of Justice
suspended payments because of budget cuts in a 2015 spending
bill.' 6' This temporary defunding of the program may significantly
www.justice.gov/oig/challenges/2013.htm.
160. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.647(1) (West 1994).
161. Von Kaehel, supra note 155, at 1482-83.
162. Kyla Dunn, Reining in Forfeiture: Common Sense Reform in the War on Drugs,
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/forfeiture.html (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016).
163. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, MO's Asset Forfeiture Reform Bill
Closes $32 Million Loophole That Let Police Divert Education Funds (May 17, 2001),
https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/mos-asset-forfeiture-reform-bill-closes-32-
million-loophole-let-police-divert.
164. WILLIAMS ETAL., supra note 10, at 71.
165. COUNCIL OF THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND PUB. SAFETY,
REP. ON BILL 20-48, "CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE ACT OF 2014," at 24 (Nov. 12, 2014).
166. Id.
167. Christopher Ingraham, The Justice Department Just Shut Down a Huge Asset For-
feiture Program, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
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limit the ability of Virginia law enforcement agencies to receive
funds from the federal civil asset forfeiture program. The De-
partment of Justice intends to restart equitable sharing pay-
ments, however, as soon as "there are sufficient funds in the
budget.'168
Nevertheless, to permanently eliminate the equitable sharing fo-
rum-shopping problem, Virginia should require that any funds
received from the federal government through equitable sharing,
adoptive forfeitures, or other civil asset forfeiture programs shall
go directly to the Literary Fund. This would require a reworking
of the law governing sharing of forfeited assets for Virginia law
enforcement agencies.169 State law should also prohibit Virginia
law enforcement agencies from applying for equitable sharing
funds from the federal government without first obtaining a crim-
inal conviction in the case.
D. Adopt Clear and Transparent Reporting Requirements
In order to engender trust in the system, the Commonwealth
should adopt clear and transparent reporting requirements and
publish them for public view. Each locality should be required to
publish a list of asset forfeiture cases and the corresponding crim-
inal charges. The localities are already required to report all asset
forfeitures to the Department of Criminal Justice Services
(DCJS).170 Until 2016, there was no requirement that DCJS com-
pile this data or publish it in a useful form, leaving the burden on
Virginia residents to file Freedom of Information Act requests if
they want to see the data, and then find experts to help them
make the data useful. A new law partially addresses the prob-
/wp/201 5/ 12/23/the-feds-just-shut-down-a-huge-program-that-lets-cops-take-your-stuff-and
-keep-it.
168. Letter from M. Kendall Day, Chief of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering
Section at the U.S. Dep't of Just. to State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies
(Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docsWeb-Uploads/doj%20asset%20for
feiture%201etter.pdf.
169. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.14 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
170. Id. § 19.2-386.4 (Repl. Vol. 2015); VA. DEP'T OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., FORFEITED
ASSET SHARING PROGRAM MANUAL 2 (2015), www.dcjs.virginia.gov/fasp/faspManual.pdf.
By regulation, DCJS requires each agency to submit a copy of the court order, a petition
for in-kind property, a list of costs incurred to manage seized assets, and a cashier's check
or money order payable to the state treasury for the forfeited assets. 6 VA. ADMIIN. CODE §
20-150-40 (2014).
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lem.'7' In December 2015, the Virginia State Crime Commission
voted to recommend several changes, including a requirement
that DCJS compile an annual report of all asset forfeitures for the
General Assembly.'7 2 Based on that recommendation, House Bill
771 provides that DCJS must submit an annual report of asset
forfeitures, including the amounts distributed to each law en-
forcement agency and to the Literary Fund.
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The law does not, however, require law enforcement to report
whether a seizure corresponds to a criminal case. This additional
requirement of reporting a corresponding criminal charge would
not be an onerous task for the law enforcement agency and could
provide for significant public accountability.
E. Increase the Burden of Proof
If asset forfeiture remains a civil action, then the standard of
proof must be increased to protect property owners. Although the
stated purpose of civil asset forfeiture laws is to deter criminal
behavior, prosecutors seeking forfeitures are allowed to operate
under civil rules."4 With these rules come a series of problems for
property owners, not least of which is the government's signifi-
cantly reduced burden of proof. While the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is guilty of a
criminal activity to secure a criminal conviction, the Common-
wealth needs to prove only by a preponderance of the evidence
that property is eligible for asset forfeiture. '75 The preponderance
of the evidence standard is generally satisfied when the proposi-
tion "is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense that
actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the
mind or minds of the tribunal, notwithstanding any doubts that
171. See H.B. 771, Va. Gen. Assemb. (Reg. Sess. 2016) (requiring DCJS to publish an
annual report detailing the distribution of forfeiture assets). The governor signed H.B. 771
into law on March 1, 2016; it will take effect on July 1, 2016. Id.
172. Frank Green, Va. State Crime Commission Declines to Support Legislation on As-
set Seizures, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 3, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.richmond.com
/news/virginialgovernment-politicsarticle b4lc2a22-5093-57dO-bOc5-fcO6f7b32aal.html;
see also VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N, POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (Dec. 3,
2015), http://vscc.virginia.gov/December%20Policy%200ptions%2OFinal- 1.pdf.
173. H.B. 771, Va. Gen. Assemb. (Reg. Sess. 2016).
174. Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfei-
ture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 920 (1991).
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10 (2015).
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may linger there."'76 In comparison, a "clear and convincing"
standard, while still lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
would require the Commonwealth to "produce evidence that cre-
ates in" the mind of the judge or jury "a firm belief or conviction
that [the Commonwealth] have proved the issue.'77 Even if no
other reform is adopted, Virginia should join the sixteen other
states that use "clear and convincing" or "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standards to confiscate property permanently.
178
Civil cases are subject to a lesser burden of proof than criminal
cases because "the consequence of losing a case, although serious
enough in many cases, is not considered to be" so severe as to re-
quire proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'79 While this rationale
makes sense for most civil litigation, the relinquishment of prop-
erty rights to the government is a sufficiently serious conse-
quence to require a higher standard of proof.
For example, when Fairfax County police pulled over Mandrel
Stuart in August 2012 for tinted windows and a video playing in
his sightline, they did not charge him with a crime but seized
$17,550 in cash.' Stuart, who is black, maintained that he was
taking the cash to Washington D.C. to buy supplies for his res-
taurant, but an officer found less than one hundredth of a gram of
marijuana and kept the money.' After a day-long trial, a jury
took thirty-five minutes to find that the federal government must
return Stuart's money and pay his legal fees of $11,825.40.s2 In
176. Lamar Co., LLC v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 620 S.E.2d 753, 756 n.5 (2005).
177. VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Instruction No. 3.110 (Matthew Bender &
Company, Inc. 2016).
178. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 10, at 22; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11488.4(i)(4) (West 1994). In July 2014, Representative Tim Walberg of Minnesota and
Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky introduced separate bills in the House and Senate that
would, among other things, increase the burden of proof in federal asset forfeiture cases
from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence. Civil Asset Forfei-
ture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2014); Fifth Amendment In-
tegrity Restoration Act of 2014, S. 2644, li3th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2014). In January 2016,
Senator Bill Carrico introduced a bill to raise the burden of proof in Virginia asset forfei-
ture cases to clear and convincing evidence. S.B. 457, Va. Gen. Assemb. (Reg. Sess. 2016).
179. CHARLES HERMAN KINNANE, A FIRST BOOK ON ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 562 (2d ed.
1952).
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the meantime, however, Stuart lost his barbeque restaurant
business in Staunton.
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Further diminishing the rights of property owners is the shift
of the burden of proof to the property owner after the government
establishes that the property is subject to forfeiture, requiring
property owners to prove that the property is exempt from forfei-
ture."' This shift in the burden of proof essentially requires prop-
erty owners to prove their innocence and flies in the face of the
presumption of innocence principle embedded in our criminal jus-
tice system. Innocent property owners who are unable to afford
an attorney are at significant disadvantage due to this onerous
requirement. Even for property owners who can afford an attor-
ney, the costs of an attorney may not justify challenging the for-
feiture of property valued at only a couple thousand dollars. In
order to bolster due process protections for property owners, Vir-
ginia should remove the burden-shifting requirement.
CONCLUSION
Virginia's asset forfeiture laws are deeply ingrained in the ju-
dicial history of the Commonwealth. Reforms adopted twenty-five
years ago to combat the distribution of narcotics significantly
changed the landscape, however, creating a profit incentive
scheme for law enforcement agencies and taking property from
individuals without adequate procedural safeguards. As law en-
forcement revenues have climbed into the millions, civil asset for-
feiture has become policing for profit rather than public safety.
Importantly, some policymakers have recognized how civil asset
forfeiture compromises fundamental principles of American jus-
tice.8 Virginia must do more to end this abusive practice.
183. Id.
184. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10(A) (2015); see WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 10, at 23.
185. Delegate Mark Cole remarked, "I just think it's fundamentally un-American that
the government can seize your property without ever having to prove that you are in collu-
sion to criminal acts." Jeff Branscome, Cole Bill Puts Limits on Police Seizures, FREE
LANCE-STAR (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.fredericksburg.com/news/cole-bill-puts-limits-on-
police-seizur es/article_4a6687f4-bd64-5919-8bb9-e074f274f320.html.
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